1. Introduction {#sec0005}
===============

In many countries, disparities in the distribution of health care capacities are a major concern for health care policy at least for two reasons. First, health care services are typically associated with categorical goods, implying the often held claim that every citizen should have equal access to an agreed minimum standard of health care. Second, a maldistribution of health care capacities may cause inefficiencies. In particular, an over-provision of health care capacities in socioeconomic attractive areas might lead to supplier induced demand [@bib0085]. Concerns about such disparities apply to nearly all facilities of health care provision, and especially to outpatient care. There is a vivid and ongoing discussion in health sciences, particularly in health economics, whether market based physician location policies cause the mentioned maldistribution, and to which extent the state should regulate or stipulate entry to regional physician markets (see, e.g., [@bib0025; @bib0060; @bib0065; @bib0075; @bib0080; @bib0145; @bib0150; @bib0155; @bib0165; @bib0180]).

There are two broad lines of research explaining spatial differences in physician densities. The first strand of literature primarily focuses on the individual location decision. The 'prior contact theory', for instance, stresses that physicians are more likely to practice near and in locations where they received their medical education or hold an affiliation to a hospital (see, e.g., [@bib0070; @bib0120]). Other authors, focusing on interviews of physicians, emphasize that individual characteristics of physicians, such as the family background, play a decisive role in the decision where to locate a practice (see, e.g., [@bib0110; @bib0125; @bib0130; @bib0135; @bib0140]). Further, there is an eminent line of research in industrial organization focusing on the individual market entry and exit decisions of physicians and its impact on competition in the health care sector (see, e.g., [@bib0005; @bib0035; @bib0040; @bib0045; @bib0050; @bib0175]).

The second line of research addresses directly the spatial distribution of physician densities and tries to identify factors explaining differences in the physician workforce over urban and rural areas. Obviously, physician densities reflect not only entry decisions but also migration and market exits of physicians. The resulting disparities are typically explained by demand-driven factors, like a region\'s demographic, socioeconomic and technological background, as well as the specific characteristics of a region\'s health care system (i.e., the availability of health care facilities acting as substitutes or complements to the outpatient physician workforce), including the corresponding legal environment which is important for a patient\'s access to health care (e.g., differences in cost sharing schedules between regions). This translates into a (reduced form) framework where the physician density at a given location is regressed on a set of a region\'s demographic, geographical, socioeconomic and institutional variables (see, e.g., [@bib0030; @bib0115; @bib0150; @bib0155]).

This paper contributes to the research on regional disparities in physician density and is, thereby, related to the second strand of literature mentioned above. Rather than treating the physician workforce as a homogeneous group, as in previous papers on this field of research, we focus on location decisions of physicians acting in two-tiered health care systems. For this purpose, we refer to the Austrian health care system, where physicians with and without a contract with the public social insurance system co-exist (henceforth, we refer to the former ones as *contract* and to the latter ones as *non-contract physicians*). While market entry for contract physicians is strongly regulated by public agencies, non-contract physicians are free to choose a location. They are also less restricted in pricing policies and service provision. For these reasons, we restrict our attention to the location decisions of non-contract physicians. Further, we distinguish between general practitioners (*GPs*) and specialists (*SPs*), leaving with four different types of physicians: non-contract and contract general practitioners (*PGPs* and *CGPs*) as well as non-contract and contract specialists (*PSPs* and *CSPs*). To study how the corresponding physician densities are related to each other, we exploit information from 121 Austrian districts over the time period 2002--2008. We estimate the local density of one type of non-contract physicians (*PGPs* or *PSPs*) as a function of the densities of contract physicians (*CGPs* and *CSPs*) and the remaining density of non-contract physicians, among other factors such as a region\'s hospital facilities, educational level or aggregate income. This, in turn, allows to draw conclusions about the existence and intensity of competition between these types of physicians in a two-tiered health care system. Our results generally suggest competitive forces between contract and non-contract physicians, which, together with the observation that the number of non-contract physicians increased sharply relative to the one of contract physicians in recent years, might also contribute to the ongoing debate about the role of non-contract physicians for health care provision in Austria.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. [Section 2](#sec0010){ref-type="sec"} describes the institutional background of the Austrian health care system, giving particular emphasis on health care provision of non-contract and contract physicians. From this, we elaborate three testable hypotheses regarding the relationship between non-contract and contract physicians. [Section 3](#sec0015){ref-type="sec"} provides a brief overview over the data, works out the econometric framework to analyze interrelations between densities of different types of physicians, and discusses our empirical findings. Finally, [Section 4](#sec0035){ref-type="sec"} concludes.

2. Institutional background and main hypotheses {#sec0010}
===============================================

From a demand and financing perspective, the public health insurance system represents the first tier of outpatient care in the Austrian health care system. Membership in this system is obligatory not only for wage earners in the public and the private sector, but also for self-employed persons (including farmers). Individuals with family ties to obligatory insured persons and without own coverage obtain free health coverage. Overall, the public health insurance covers around 98.5 percent of the whole population, excluding only marginal groups from public health insurance. It is mainly financed by income related contributions. Private health insurance and out-of-pocket payments constitute the second tier of the Austrian health care system. Roughly 35 percent of the population has signed contracts with private sickness funds, which predominantly offer additional coverage to the first tier services and/or improve the possibility to choose a provider within the system.

Health care services are supplied by contracted physicians and by their non-contracted counterparts. Both groups are self-employed and are mainly working in single practices (see [@bib0105]). The spatial distribution of contract physicians is based on a location plan agreed between the public health insurance system and the Chamber of Physicians. It specifies the regional distribution of the physician workforce derived from the basic health needs of the relevant population. It also has to ensure a sufficient provision of medical services based on the existing state of medical standards. A contract physician\'s contract relies on bilateral agreements negotiated between the relevant (regional or federal) Chamber of Physicians and the Federal Association of Social Security Institutions on behalf of the sickness funds. It determines important dimensions of physician services, such as the practice style (e.g., office hours, treatment guidelines or restrictions of additional occupations) or the physician payment scheme. The assignment of a contract is based on criteria like waiting time or professional experience. Once concluded, the contract is not limited in time.

Contract physicians generate income from fee-for-service and lump-sum payments. The latter can be claimed for initial contacts and for the provision of basic services. The share of lump-sum payments to total physician earnings varies widely over different fields of specialization. At an aggregate level, it amounts to about 68 percent for *CGPs* and around 34 percent for *CSPs* [@bib0185]. The fee-for-service component of remuneration includes earning caps, inducing decreasing marginal revenues per patient and treatment. Contract physicians are also allowed to earn extra money by providing additional services beyond the contract (e.g., school services). The scale of these activities, however, is strictly regulated by the physician contract (e.g., via upper limits of working time in such occupations).

In contrast to contract physicians, their private counterparts are free to choose their practice location. Their remuneration is mainly based on a fee-for-service system. The corresponding fees are agreed between the physician and the patients, albeit there exists a recommendation for the physician pricing policy by the Chamber of Physicians. Further, they are allowed to earn extra money without any restrictions (e.g., by working in a private or public hospital).

Patients with public health insurance coverage are basically free to consult a contract or a non-contract physician,[1](#fn0005){ref-type="fn"} but the incurred costs are considerably different. While the utilization of public outpatient health care is based on a benefit-in-kind scheme with only negligible cost-sharing elements,[2](#fn0010){ref-type="fn"} treatment costs in the private sector (i) have to be paid out-of-pocket, (ii) are born by the private health insurances, and/or (iii) by the public health insurance. The latter only reimburses parts of a non-contract physician\'s invoice. The maximum amount refunded is fixed at 80 percent of the amount a contract physician would receive, but only if the non-contract physician\'s services are included in the public benefit catalogue. Further, since prices of such services are usually well above the ones of contract physicians, the cost sharing rate is much higher than 20 percent in most cases.[3](#fn0015){ref-type="fn"} Therefore, we would expect that services of non-contract physicians are only demanded if the additional costs are at least covered by the expected benefits (e.g., shorter waiting times or higher treatment quality; see [@bib0160], for a more general approach on private health care demand; Samhaber [@bib0170] provides empirical evidence from Austria on different motives to contact non-contract physicians). In this case, contract and non-contract physicians are competing for more or less the same population of patients, especially when providing very similar health services. Consequently, services of non-contract and contract physicians can be viewed as substitutes, suggesting a negative relationship between the corresponding physician densities (in the following, we refer to this as '*competition effect*'). This competitive relationship between physicians is summarized in the solid dark arrows of [Fig. 1](#fig0005){ref-type="fig"}.

The competition effect implies that non-contract and contract physicians of the same type provide substitutive services, so that we would expect that *PSPs* and *PGPs* tend to avoid markets with a higher number of *CSPs* and *CGPs*, respectively. This is captured in \#1 and \#2 of [Fig. 1](#fig0005){ref-type="fig"}. Our first hypothesis with regard to the relationship between non-contract and contract physicians is as follows:

Hypothesis 1The density of *PGPs* (*PSPs*) should be negatively related to the density of *CGPs* (*CSPs*).

On the other hand, patients typically use to visit a *CGP* first when demanding health care services.[4](#fn0020){ref-type="fn"} Therefore, *CGPs* are able to influence patient flows to other physicians via their referral behavior, indicated as gray shaded arrows in [Fig. 1](#fig0005){ref-type="fig"}. Although referrals are not obligatory, they enable contract physicians to alleviate treatment maximizing strategies intended to compensate for decreasing returns per patient and treatment, resulting from the above mentioned remuneration scheme. From this, it is generally plausible to assume a positive relationship between the density of *CGPs* and *PSPs* (henceforth '*referral effect*', \#3 in [Fig. 1](#fig0005){ref-type="fig"}). It should be noticed, however, that referrals from the public to the private sector are rather unusual in Austria. *CGPs* usually refer to *CSPs* (\#7 in the figure), and thus, we do not expect that *PSPs* benefit strongly from a *CGP* located in the same area.[5](#fn0025){ref-type="fn"} Therefore, we are able to derive a second hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2Since *PSPs* and *CGPs* partly provide the same services and referrals from the public to the private sector are uncommon, the density of *PSPs* should be negatively associated with the density of *CGPs*.

By way of contrast, the referral effect should be stronger for *PGPs* if treatments are cumbersome or time consuming [@bib0175]. Then, the density of *PSPs* would be higher in locations with a higher *PGP* density, and vice versa (i.e., *PGPs* benefit from presence of *PSPs* as they create referral opportunities, see \#5 in [Fig. 1](#fig0005){ref-type="fig"}).[6](#fn0030){ref-type="fn"} Further, non-contract physicians are more exposed to competition as they are not 'protected' by a physician location plan. Baumgardner [@bib0020] has shown that physicians tend to cooperate or build up networks under such conditions, which might be especially the case between non-contract *GPs* and *SPs*. Although the substitutive effect might also play a role between *PGPs* and *PSPs* (\#4 in the figure), we would presume that it is outweighed by a relatively strong impact of referral and network effects. This leads to our final hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3Due to referrals, the density of *PSPs* should be positively related to the density of *PGPs*. Further, since *PGPs* benefit from cooperation with *PSPs* if treatments are cumbersome or time consuming, the impact of *PSP* density on the density of *PGPs* should be positive.

Notice that also *CSPs* benefit from referrals of *CGPs* (\#7 in [Fig. 1](#fig0005){ref-type="fig"}) and, to a lesser extent, of *PGPs* (arrow \#6). However, as the location of contract physicians follows a fixed location plan by the Austrian public health insurance, it is reasonable to assume that the densities of *CGPs* and *CSPs* are not seriously influenced by private resources of outpatient health care. After all, our description of the Austrian health care system shows that the density of each particular type of physicians is affected by the density of the other types of physicians. Below, we propose a specific empirical framework to address these interrelations.

3. Empirical analysis {#sec0015}
=====================

3.1. Data and descriptives {#sec0020}
--------------------------

To test the above mentioned interrelations among non-contract and contract physicians empirically, we employ a data set from 121 Austrian districts between 2002 and 2008.[7](#fn0035){ref-type="fn"} Data from physicians and their specialties are available from Göschl CD MED, *Handbuch für die Sanitätsberufe Österreichs* (years 2002--2008). As shown in [Table 1](#tbl0005){ref-type="table"}, our sample includes 14,569 (non-contract and contract) physicians, on average. Over the whole sample period, about 56 percent of all self-employed physicians have signed a contract with the public health insurance system, approximately 48 percent of them are *CSPs*. The share of *PSPs* is somewhat higher (around 70 percent) in the group of non-contract physicians. Further, we can see a substantial increase (about 27 percent) in non-contract physicians over the course of the years, which is the result of increased medical graduates and stable capacity plans for contract physicians. Finally, we also observe enough variation for the number of non-contract physicians over time (the average annual change is around five percent for non-contract physicians, but much lower for contract physicians), rendering panel data (fixed effects) estimation possible.

Based on the physicians' locations, we are able to calculate the number of physicians per district and specialty. In addition, we use information on regional supply and demand for health services, in our case a district\'s aggregate income, its average educational level (measured by an index between zero and five)[8](#fn0040){ref-type="fn"}, living area capturing transport and time cost to consult a physician, and the facilities of private and public inpatient care as measured by a district\'s total number of beds in private and public hospitals (the corresponding data sources are listed in the [Appendix](#sec0040){ref-type="sec"}).

[Table 2](#tbl0010){ref-type="table"} provides a descriptive overview of the dataset, including means, standard deviations as well as minimum and maximum values of our variables from the empirical analysis below. Overall, our sample includes 847 observations, i.e., 121 districts over seven years. On average, we observe 37 (around 32) *PSPs* (*CSPs*) in a district, with a minimum of zero (one) and a maximum of 275 (227) physicians. The corresponding figures for *GPs* are lower, with mean values of around 16 (*PGPs*) and 35 (*CGPs*). The block on the right-hand-side of [Table 2](#tbl0010){ref-type="table"} shows that the average density of *PSPs*, defined as the number of *PSPs* in a district over the population size in 1000 inhabitants, is 0.68. The maximum is around 10.1. For contract specialists, we observe a mean (maximum) value of 0.54 (4.39), and for *CGPs* we have a similar mean value of 0.53 (0.76). Only for *PGPs* we have a relatively small representation in our sample (see [Table 1](#tbl0005){ref-type="table"}), translating in a much lower density of 0.27 (the maximum entry is 2.87).

Average annual income (net of taxes), measured by a district\'s total income to population size, amounts to about 17,400 Euro (the minimum is about 14,700 Euro and the maximum amounts to 28,500 Euro). The largest district in our sample is around 1100 km^2^, with an average value of 270 km^2^. Further, we observe an average of around 123 (400) hospital beds in the private (public) inpatient sector. The corresponding maxima lie around 1572 and 3605 beds.[9](#fn0045){ref-type="fn"}

[Table 3](#tbl0015){ref-type="table"} summarizes the distribution of physicians over general practitioners and 14 specialties; the upper table block refers to the number of non-contract, and the lower one to the number of contract physicians within a district. For example, we can see that there are, on average, about 16 *GPs* within a district; the corresponding maximum is 93. Within the group of non-contract physicians, the main specializations are represented by internists (around 22.5 percent of all specialists), surgeons (21.7 percent), neurologists (14.3 percent) and gynecologists (12.7 percent). These are also the largest specializations among contract physicians. There, our sample includes about 17.4 percent internists, 8.7 percent surgeons, 12.5 percent neurologists and 14.3 percent gynecologists. Looking at the maximum entries, we observe some specializations with rather low representations in both groups of physicians, which is especially the case for lung doctors, urologists, laboratory diagnostics and radiologists. In the empirical analysis below, we account for the composition of specializations by (i) analyzing the whole group of *SPs* and (ii) by focusing on specializations with relatively strong representations in our sample of non-contract physicians, i.e., internists, surgeons, neurologists and gynecologists.

The last column of [Table 3](#tbl0015){ref-type="table"} reports the share of physicians working in a public or private hospital in addition to the activities in their practices. In this regard, we can see that there are large differences between *GPs* and *SPs* on the one hand, and between non-contract and contract specialists on the other one. On average, more than 50 percent of all non-contract specialists take up such outside activities, a share that varies between 18 (pediatricians) and 68 percent (surgeons). Obviously, hospital facilities might be viewed as an opportunity to provide additional services and, therefore, a way to increase income. From this, we would expect that it is attractive to locate the practice near a hospital. In the empirical analysis below, we explicitly account for this reasoning using the number of hospital beds within a district as a control variable to explain physician density.

[Table 4](#tbl0020){ref-type="table"} describes how (non-contract and contract) *SPs* and *GPs* are distributed over the Austrian districts. For example, we can see that there are seven districts in Austria with less than five *PSPs* located within the district. The lion\'s share of the Austrian districts sustain more than five and less than 25 non-contract physicians, especially in the group of *PSPs*. With regard to contract physicians, we observe the main group of representation in the classes of more than 5 and less than 25 and of more than 25 and less than 50 physicians. Generally, we have relatively few districts with a low representation in our sample, so that it seems enough variation over districts rendering regression analysis possible.

Finally, we provide four figures in [Appendix](#sec0040){ref-type="sec"} depicting the spatial distribution of *PSPs* ([Fig. 2](#fig0010){ref-type="fig"}), *PGPs* ([Fig. 3](#fig0015){ref-type="fig"}), *CSPs* ([Fig. 4](#fig0020){ref-type="fig"}) and *CGPs* ([Fig. 5](#fig0025){ref-type="fig"}), where the borders represent the districts as our observational units (all entries in the figures relate to 2005). Each entry in these figures indicates a physician\'s location. Comparing the figures for (non-contract and contract) *SPs* with the ones of *GPs* we can see that the former are more located in agglomerations (i.e., the larger cities), while the latter are more uniformly distributed over both rural and urban areas. This pattern is less pronounced for non-contract physicians.

3.2. Specification and estimation {#sec0025}
---------------------------------

We are interested to explain the densities of (i) *PSPs* and (ii) *PGPs* as a function of (contract and the remaining non-contract) physicians and other demand- and supply-related covariates of a district. Our sample includes 121 Austrian districts over seven years, so that we can rely on a balanced panel. We estimate two separate regressions, which read as

$$\mathit{PSP}_{\mathit{it}} = \alpha_{1}\mathit{PGP}_{\mathit{it}} + \alpha_{2}\mathit{CSP}_{\mathit{it}} + \alpha_{3}\mathit{CGP}_{\mathit{it}} + \mathbf{\text{X}}_{i}\mathbf{\delta} + \lambda_{i} + \nu_{\mathit{it}},$$$$\mathit{PGP}_{\mathit{it}} = \beta_{1}\mathit{PSP}_{\mathit{it}} + \beta_{2}\mathit{CSP}_{\mathit{it}} + \beta_{3}\mathit{CGP}_{\mathit{it}} + \mathbf{\text{X}}_{i}\mathbf{\gamma} + \mu_{i} + ɛ_{\mathit{it}},$$ where *i* indicates the *i*th district, *i* = 1, ..., *n*. *t* is a time index, *t* = 1, ..., *T*. *PSP*, *CSP*, *PGP* and *CGP* represent time-variant densities of non-contract and contract specialists as well as non-contract and contract general practitioners. As mentioned above, physician density is measured as the number of a group of physicians within a district per 1000 inhabitants. **X**~*i*~ contains a matrix of independent variables including a district\'s availability of hospital beds in the public and private sector, average income, an index of its educational level (see footnote [8](#fn0040){ref-type="fn"}), and living area. Living area and the number of beds in private and public hospitals are time invariant as well as all of the remaining variables in **X** as they refer to the year 2001 (the year where the actual population census has been carried out). *λ*~*i*~ and *μ*~*i*~ represent unobserved *i*-specific effects, *ν*~*it*~ and *ɛ*~*it*~ are idiosyncratic error terms.

From the discussion of [Fig. 1](#fig0005){ref-type="fig"} it is obvious that the right-hand-side densities of non-contract physicians are probably endogenous. Further, we should also account for endogeneity of (time-invariant) density of hospital beds in the private sector. For instance, it might be true that the *PSP* density in Eq. [(1)](#eq0015){ref-type="disp-formula"} is influenced by a district\'s *PGP* density, but causation might also run in the opposite direction if the presence of *PSPs* raises a district\'s attractiveness for *PGPs* due to increased referral opportunities. Similarly, it is reasonable that private hospitals are located in areas where the availability of non-contract physicians is high. Such endogeneity issues also apply to Eq. [(2)](#eq0020){ref-type="disp-formula"}. We assume that these interrelations are *i*-specific, so that the density of *PGPs* is correlated with *λ*~*i*~ in Eq. [(1)](#eq0015){ref-type="disp-formula"} and orthogonal to *ν*~*it*~, and the one of *PSPs* is correlated with *μ*~*i*~ and orthogonal to *ɛ*~*it*~ in Eq. [(2)](#eq0020){ref-type="disp-formula"}. Further, we assume that the right-hand-side densities of both contract physicians and public hospital beds are exogenous, which might be justified by the fact that they are determined by the physician capacity and hospital plans.

Applying a fixed effects (FE) estimator under these conditions would remove the time invariant **X**~*i*~-variables, but still provides consistent estimates of *α*~1~ and *β*~1~ as well as of *α*~2~, *α*~3~, *β*~2~ and *β*~3~ (see, e.g., [@bib0090]). To estimate the parameters ***δ*** and ***γ***, we apply a random effects model as developed by Hausman and Taylor [@bib0095]. They propose to assess the effects of time-invariant variables in panels by generalized least squares (GLS) applying an instrumental variable estimator to treat possibly endogenous regressors. In our case, this approach is useful to address the potential endogeneity of the right-hand-side densities of non-contract physicians and private hospital beds. Basically, the *HT*-estimator starts with the consistent *FE*-estimates, takes the within residuals of this regression, say ${\widehat{e}}_{\mathit{it}}$, and, in a second step, regresses ${\widehat{e}}_{\mathit{it}}$ on **X**~*i*~ using the time-variant exogenous variables as instruments (in our case, the densities of contract physicians). From this, we obtain estimates of $\mathbf{\widehat{\delta}}$ and $\mathbf{\widehat{\gamma}}$, which, along with the estimates of the *α*s and *β*s from the within regression, can be used to estimate the variance components ${\widehat{\sigma}}_{\lambda}^{2}$ (${\widehat{\sigma}}_{\mu}^{2}$) and ${\widehat{\sigma}}_{\nu}^{2}$ (${\widehat{\sigma}}_{ɛ}^{2}$) in Eq. [(1)](#eq0015){ref-type="disp-formula"} \[Eq. [(2)](#eq0020){ref-type="disp-formula"}\]. The estimated variance components can be used to apply a GLS transformation on each variable in the model.[10](#fn0050){ref-type="fn"} Denoting the GLS transform of each variable with '\*', we finally obtain the *HT*-estimator from the regressions

$$\mathit{PSP}_{\mathit{it}}^{*} = \alpha_{1}\mathit{PGP}_{\mathit{it}}^{*} + \alpha_{2}\mathit{CSP}_{\mathit{it}}^{*} + \alpha_{3}\mathit{CGP}_{\mathit{it}}^{*} + \mathbf{\text{X}}_{i}^{*}\mathbf{\delta} + \lambda_{i}^{*} + \nu_{\mathit{it}}^{*},$$using the within average ${\overline{y}}_{\mathit{it}}$, ${\overline{\overline{y}}}_{\mathit{it}} = y_{\mathit{it}} - {\overline{y}}_{\mathit{it}}$ and the level of the time-invariant but exogenous **X**~*i*~-variables as instruments, where *y* ∈ {*PGP*, *CSP*, *CGP*}. Similarly, the *HT*-estimator of Eq. [(2)](#eq0020){ref-type="disp-formula"} is exploited from

$$\mathit{PGP}_{\mathit{it}}^{*} = \beta_{1}\mathit{PSP}_{\mathit{it}}^{*} + \beta_{2}\mathit{CSP}_{\mathit{it}}^{*} + \beta_{3}\mathit{CGP}_{\mathit{it}}^{*} + \mathbf{\text{X}}_{i}^{*}\mathbf{\gamma} + \mu_{i}^{*} + ɛ_{\mathit{it}}^{*},$$using ${\overline{z}}_{\mathit{it}}$, ${\overline{\overline{z}}}_{\mathit{it}} = z_{\mathit{it}} - {\overline{z}}_{\mathit{it}}$ and the level of the time-invariant but exogenous **X**~*i*~-variables as instruments, where *z* ∈ {*PSP*, *CSP*, *CGP*}. According to Amemiya and MaCurdy [@bib0010], we further assume that *λ*~*i*~ (*μ*~*i*~) are uncorrelated with the right-hand-side variables in Eq. [(1)](#eq0015){ref-type="disp-formula"} \[Eq. [(2)](#eq0020){ref-type="disp-formula"}\], imposing a stricter requirement on the instruments than the original *HT*-estimator.

To test the *HT*-model against its *FE* counterpart we apply a Sargan test on over-identification [@bib0100]. The corresponding test statistic is distributed as *χ*^2^ with *T* times the number of exogenous time-varying variables minus the number of endogenous time-invariant variables as degrees of freedom. If the test statistic is insignificant, the model is consistent and more efficient than its fixed effects counterpart. If not, one should prefer the *FE*-estimates. Finally, we take the logarithm of all variables in our empirical models to account for the fact that especially the dependent variables (densities of *PSPs* and *PGPs*) are not normally distributed but log-normally. We further tested the linear against the logarithmic model applying a *J*-test as proposed by Davidson and MacKinnon [@bib0055], indicating that the logarithmic specification outperforms the one without logarithms.[11](#fn0055){ref-type="fn"}

3.3. Estimation results {#sec0030}
-----------------------

[Table 5](#tbl0025){ref-type="table"} summarizes our estimation results. The Sargan test in the last line of the table is insignificant for both specifications, indicating that our instruments are valid and, therefore, the *HT*-estimates should be preferred over the ones of the *FE*-model (not reported in the table). With regard to the time-invariant covariates, we observe insignificant effects of private hospital beds, which might be explained by the fact that this variable is not varying over time and not much over districts. The density of public hospital beds is significantly positive for *PSPs* and significantly negative for *PGPs*, suggesting that *PSPs* (*PGPs*) tend to seek (avoid) markets with public inpatient facilities. One explanation might be that services of specialists are typically close substitutes to the one of inpatient facilities (and especially their outdoor ambulances), which is not necessarily the case for *GPs*. Education enters positively, but is insignificant in the *PGP* equation. Income and living area exhibit insignificant effects in both the *PSP* and *PGP* equations. Generally, one should interpret the corresponding (negative and positive) parameter estimates cautiously as there is a close correlation between both variables.

Regarding our relationship of interest, we are not able to confirm the competition effect between *CSPs* and *PSPs* ([Hypothesis 1](#enun0005){ref-type="statement"}), as the density of *CSPs* does not appear significant in the *PSP* equation. However, this might be due to the choice of the dependent variable, as the effects between different specialties might cancel out each other, leading to a non-significant coefficient for *CPSs*. For instance, it is reasonable that otolaryngologists or gynecologists do not compete with dermatologists in a region. Below, we account for this measurement issue distinguishing between different specialties in our regressions. In contrast, [Hypothesis 1](#enun0005){ref-type="statement"} is confirmed for *PGPs*, where we observe a significantly negative impact of *CGP* density, indicating a dominance of the competition effect over the referral effect.

With respect to [Hypothesis 2](#enun0010){ref-type="statement"}, we find an insignificant negative impact of *CGP* density on the density of *PSPs*, indicating that the competition effect more or less compensates the referral effect for this type of physicians. Thus, *CGPs* appear to be substitutes rather than complements to non-contract specialists. One obvious explanation might be that *CGPs* act as profit maximizers and prefer longer treatment processes instead of referring to *PSPs*. As mentioned above, this is due to the institutional design of the Austrian health care system, where *GPs* are able to refer to a specialist when necessary, although it is not compulsory in most cases. Further, the negative coefficient might reflect that *CGPs* prefer *CSPs* rather than *PSPs* when referring to a specialist.

By way of contrast, we find support for referrals from *PGPs* to *PSPs*, entering positively in the *PSP* equation. This lend support to [Hypothesis 3](#enun0015){ref-type="statement"} as it seems that non-contract physicians (*GPs* and *SPs*) closely collaborate with each other and to some extent build up networks within their districts. Similarly, the coefficient of *PSP* density in the equation for *PGPs* is also positive and significant, implying a certain degree of network and cooperation effects, which might be the result of referrals among non-contract physicians ([Hypothesis 3](#enun0015){ref-type="statement"}). Similar to the *PSP* equation, we find no significant relationship between the densities of *CSPs* and *PGPs*.

In sum, our estimation results from [Table 5](#tbl0025){ref-type="table"} might be interpreted that *PSPs* and *PGPs* tend to establish networks or cooperations within their districts. The density of *CGPs* enters significantly negative in the *PGP*-equation, indicating competition effects especially with *PGPs* and a relatively low importance of referrals to *PSPs*. For *CSPs*, we are not able to identify any significant effects on the densities of *PGPs* and *PSPs*. It should be noticed that the latter include a wide variety of very different specialities (see [Table 3](#tbl0015){ref-type="table"}), which might explain the insignificant impact of *CSPs*, as discussed above. We account for this by re-estimating Eq. [(2)](#eq0020){ref-type="disp-formula"} separately for the four largest groups of specialities reported in [Table 3](#tbl0015){ref-type="table"} (i.e., internal specialists, surgeons, neurologists and gynecologists), including the corresponding densities of *CSPs* as the right-hand-side variable, among the other ones in Eq. [(2)](#eq0020){ref-type="disp-formula"}. The estimation results from this exercise are reported in [Table 6](#tbl0030){ref-type="table"}. Again, we rely on the *HT*-estimates, which can be justified by the insignificant Sargan test statistics reported in the bottom line of the table.

Comparing the estimation results of [Table 6](#tbl0030){ref-type="table"} with the ones of [Table 5](#tbl0025){ref-type="table"}, we firstly observe positive parameter estimates for the density of *PGPs*, which seems to confirm the above mentioned cooperation and network effects between non-contract physicians according to [Hypothesis 3](#enun0015){ref-type="statement"}. Further, and in line with [Hypothesis 2](#enun0010){ref-type="statement"}, we find negative effects of *CGP* density again, indicating competition between *PSPs* and *CGPs*. The exceptions are neurologists and gynecologists with insignificant parameter estimates, but significantly positive estimates for private facilities of inpatient care. This is not surprising as patients usually do not visit a *GP* when demanding services from these specialities. Most importantly however, we now find a significantly negative impact of *CSP* densities on the ones of non-contract specialists in three out of four regressions (the exception is non-contract surgeons in column 1 of [Table 6](#tbl0030){ref-type="table"}), indicating that there is competition between non-contract and contract specialists within the same specialization. This result is consistent with [Hypothesis 1](#enun0005){ref-type="statement"} and, to some extent, it also confirms Atella and Deb [@bib0015], who find a substitutive individual health care utilization between contract and non-contract physicians using Italian data.

Overall, our estimation results suggest that referrals from *CGPs* to *PSPs* are obviously not strong enough to compensate competition forces between contract and non-contract physicians, which are inherently present in the two-tiered Austrian health care system. In contrast, we find a more pronounced referral behavior for *PGPs*, indicating cooperation and network effects within non-contract physicians. Further, our results reveal that location decisions of *PSPs* are negatively associated with the density of *CSPs* (at least within the same specialty), suggesting that the market for outpatient health care of specialists reacts to competitive forces.

4. Conclusions {#sec0035}
==============

This paper assesses location decisions of physicians as measured by physician densities at the regional level. We extend the previous research relying on a two-tiered health care system with co-existing public (contracted) and private health care providers. Using data from 121 Austrian districts between 2002 and 2008 we focus on four groups of physicians: contract general practitioners and specialists as well as their private counterparts. The latter are almost free to set prices for their services and, apart from that, are not restricted in their location choices. Therefore, we estimate the densities of (i) non-contract specialists and (ii) non-contract general practitioners as a function of the densities of contract general practitioners and specialists and the remaining density of non-contract physicians, along with other control variables such as the availability of private and public inpatient facilities within a district. Some of these variables are potentially endogenous, others are time-invariant (e.g., the availability of hospitals), suggesting to apply a Hausman--Taylor framework for panel data in our application.

Our findings might be summarized as follows. First, we find a positive association between the densities of non-contract general practitioners and non-contract specialists, indicating a relatively strong referral effect between these groups of physicians. One reason might be strong collaboration or even the existence of medical networks among non-contract physicians. Second, we observe a negative impact of the density of contracted specialists on the one of non-contract physicians, indicating relatively strong competition forces among these physicians. Finally, we observe a negative impact of the density of contract general practitioners on non-contract general practitioners, and an insignificant effect on non-contract specialists. While the former result might be explained by competition among (contract and non-contract) general practitioners, the latter might be a result of the referral behavior of contract general practitioners, who tend to prefer contract physicians when referring to specialists.

This paper contributes to the ongoing debate on the role of non-contract physicians in the two-tiered Austrian health care system in general, and as a provider of care for clients of the public insurance system in particular. To date, private (non-contract) resources of outpatient care are not included in the physician capacity plans of the public health insurance system. While non-contract physicians to some extent enlarge the consumer choice for publicly funded outpatient care, private treatments usually also involve substantial cost sharing. Thus, this enlargement effect is particularly relevant for high income patients. Furthermore, we observe a marked increase in the number of non-contract physicians (*PSPs* and *PGPs*) over the course of the years, while the number of contract physicians strictly follows the capacity plans, and therefore, remained nearly constant over the same time period. Given the high number of medical graduates from medical universities, the relevance of the private health care sector will increase further in the near future.

From a health policy perspective, the positive relationship between different non-contract physician categories is ambiguous. On the one hand, it could reflect the existence of efficient referral systems. But on the other hand, the expanding number of private physicians could also indicate an increase of supplier induced demand, which could adversely influence the macroeconomic stability of the outpatient sector as a whole. The negative relationship between non-contract and contract physicians -- signaling a substitution effect -- could lead to the interpretation that the private sector to some extent is an alternative to the public sector. Given the existing institutional design, this empirical pattern could imply that either (i) the current capacity plans are not sufficient for their specified goal of equity in the form of an area-wide health care provision and/or (ii) that both the increase in the number and the positive relationship between the different types of non-contract physicians indicate a possible increase of supplier induced demand with negative effects on service quality and the financial accountability of the system in general.

While our results might stimulate further research on location decisions of physicians, we would be cautious to derive too far-reaching policy recommendations from our analysis. The paper primarily focuses on spatial differences in non-contract physician density. Obviously, these differences reflect varieties in the (expected) demand for physician services, but we would need more information on the actual utilization patterns of both contract and non-contract physicians to propose possible changes in the institutional design of outpatient care. Thus, further analysis seems necessary based on more detailed information of utilization numbers, patients' motives to visit a non-contract physician (e.g., quality, waiting time, and distance), and the interaction of different physician categories. Such an analysis is beyond the scope of our paper. In addition, the necessary data to study such issues is not available so far. As non-contract physicians are hardly regulated in Austria, they constitute somewhat a 'black box' even for the public health insurance, which (at least in part) pays for their services. Thus, our findings also suggest to establish a reporting system for non-contract physicians to analyze interdependencies between different types of physicians further.

Appendix A. Data sources {#sec0040}
========================

•Data on physician location is taken from CD-MED. Handbuch für die Sanitätsberufe Österreichs. Wien: Verlag Dieter Göschl; 2002--2008.•Information on the number of hospital beds in public and private hospitals is covered in BMG. Krankenanstaltenverzeichnis Österreich. Wien: Bundesministerium für Gesundheit; 2008.•Data on a district\'s population, educational level and living area is compiled in Statistik Austria. Volkszählung, Wien (Austrian Population Census); 2002.•Region\'s income is calculated from Statistik Austria. Integrierte Statistik der Lohn- und Einkommensteuer. Wien; 2004--2006.

Patients are also allowed to visit ambulatory care facilities of the public sickness funds. These facilities are especially important in dental care (exemptions are the provinces of Vienna and Styria, where ambulatory care facilities offer a broader range of services). In the empirical analysis below, we do not include dentists and, therefore, also leave out ambulatory facilities.

This is essentially the case for the sickness funds which are organized on territorial principles (Gebietskrankenkassen), basically covering employees in the private sector and roughly including 80 percent of the Austrian population. The corresponding regulatory framework of sickness funds for farmers, self employed and civil servants is somewhat different (especially with regard to the above mentioned cost-sharing elements).

Rough calculations for the period 2000--2004 show that the cost sharing percentage of the submitted physician bills amounts to about 40--70 percent, with huge differences among specialties. Public insurance officials argue that only 50 percent of the public insured patients submit their physician bill for reimbursement. Thus, we presume that the overall percentage of cost-sharing to utilize non-contract physician services is even higher than the share mentioned above. In addition, our data show that the public health insurance system spends around 10 percent of its expenditure for outpatient care to reimburse the costs of non-contract physicians. Finally, the costs of non-contract physicians are not reimbursed if the patient further contacts a contract physician of the same type within the same accounting period.

Apart from this practical experience, it has to be mentioned that the gatekeeping role of *GPs* is relatively weak in Austria, not only for non-contract but also for contract physicians. Referral is only compulsory for some very specific outpatient services (especially X-rays and other diagnostic procedures such as computer tomography or magnetic resonance) and for hospital stays [@bib0105]. In addition, hospitals also run outdoor departments (ambulances). Access to these ambulances does not require referrals from *GPs* or specialists.

Interestingly, the literature on the physicians' referral behavior is relatively scarce. One exception is Atella and Deb [@bib0015], who analyze doctor visits in Italy at the individual level. Among other things, they observe that contract and non-contract specialist visits are negatively affected by primary care physician visits, indicating a competitive relationship between primary care physicians and specialists. However, the corresponding coefficient on non-contract specialists is much higher than the one on contract specialists, which, in turn, seems to confirm our observation from Austria that *CGPs* typically prefer *CSPs* over *PSPs* when referring to specialists.

Similarly, Atella and Deb [@bib0015] find that visits to primary care physicians, contract specialists and non-contract specialists are all positively related to unobserved heterogeneity. While we are not able to draw such a conclusion due to a lack of individual data, this result also suggests a positive relationship among non-contract physicians, as they will tend to locate in attractive markets where the demand for health care is high, i.e., where people are already consuming a high amount of health care services.

At the sub-national level, Austria is organized in nine federal states, 121 regional districts (including 23 districts of Vienna) and 2357 local jurisdictions (communities and cities).

Specifically, we consider five main groups of educational levels. From these, we calculate an average level of education multiplying the numbers of persons in each group with the corresponding level of education, and dividing the sum of the subgroups by the population above 15 years, i.e.,$$E = \frac{\sum\limits_{L = 1}^{5}\mathit{POP}_{L} \cdot L}{\mathit{POP}_{15}}.$$*L* corresponds to the level of education, *POP*~*L*~ indicates the population in each subgroup, and *POP*~15~ is the overall population above 15 years. The educational levels considered are (1) compulsory school, (2) apprenticeship or secondary education, (3) higher school certificate (general qualification for university entrance), (4) an additional education after this school-leaving certificate (e.g., a polytechnic education or a college) excluding university education, and (5) a university degree or equivalent. Thus, we obtain an index measuring the average educational level ranging from 1 to 5 within regions, where increasing values indicate a higher level of education.

A correlation matrix reveals that there is a close relationship between all suppliers of the health care system, which is not surprising given the above-mentioned interrelations among contract and non-contract physicians and hospital facilities. The corresponding figures are available from the authors upon request.

Denoting each variable in our model with $w$, the GLS transform is given by $w_{\mathit{it}}^{*} = w_{\mathit{it}} - \theta{\overline{w}}_{\mathit{it}}$, where $\theta = 1 - {({\widehat{\sigma}}_{\nu}^{2}/{\widehat{\sigma}}_{\nu}^{2} + T_{i}{\widehat{\sigma}}_{\lambda}^{2})}^{1/2}$ in Eq. [(1)](#eq0015){ref-type="disp-formula"}[@bib0090]. Similar applies to Eq. [(2)](#eq0020){ref-type="disp-formula"}.

Below, we do not report the results of *FE*-estimation and also the ones without logarithms for the sake of brevity. They are available from the authors upon request.

![Competition and referral between non-contract and contract physicians. *Notes:* Competition between physicians is represented by the dark arrows, referrals from one type of physicians to other ones are indicated by the gray shaded arrows. Dashed arrows indicate relationships between physicians that are not addressed in the empirical analysis below.](gr1){#fig0005}

![Spatial distribution of non-contract specialists.](gr2){#fig0010}

![Spatial distribution of non-contract general practitioners.](gr3){#fig0015}

![Spatial distribution of contract specialists.](gr4){#fig0020}

![Spatial distribution of contract general practitioners.](gr5){#fig0025}

###### 

Non-contract and contract physicians in Austria.

  Year                                 Number of physicians                           
  ------------------------------------ ---------------------- ------- ------- ------- --------
  2002                                 3675                   1560    3940    4289    13,464
  2003                                 4013                   1730    3924    4258    13,925
  2004                                 4200                   1792    3925    4261    14,178
  2005                                 4612                   2015    3932    4246    14,805
  2006                                 4875                   2046    3925    4217    15,063
  2007                                 5025                   2088    3918    4194    15,225
  2008                                 5139                   2115    3896    4165    15,315
  Average                              4506                   1907    3923    4233    14,569
  Change 2002--2008 (in percent)       28.49                  26.24   −1.12   −2.98   12.09
  Average annual change (in percent)   5.79                   5.30    −0.19   −0.49   2.18

*PSP*, non-contract specialist; *PGP*, non-contract general practitioner; *CSP*, contract specialist; *CGP*, contract general practitioner.

###### 

Descriptive statistics (847 observations).

  Variable                                                    Absolute number   Densities[c](#tblfn0015){ref-type="table-fn"}                                         
  ----------------------------------------------------------- ----------------- ----------------------------------------------- ------- -------- ------ ------ ------ -------
  Number of *PSP*                                             37.24             47.46                                           0.00    274.00   0.68   1.16   0.00   10.14
  Number of *PGP*                                             15.75             15.05                                           0.00    93.00    0.27   0.30   0.00   2.87
  Number of *CSP*                                             32.42             33.13                                           0.00    227.00   0.54   0.55   0.00   4.39
  Number of *CGP*                                             34.98             20.58                                           1.00    161.00   0.53   0.07   0.33   0.76
  Private hospital beds[a](#tblfn0005){ref-type="table-fn"}   1.23              2.11                                            0.00    15.72    1.77   2.63   0.00   13.38
  Public hospital beds[a](#tblfn0005){ref-type="table-fn"}    4.00              5.77                                            0.00    36.05    6.11   7.77   0.00   53.87
  Average income[b](#tblfn0010){ref-type="table-fn"}          17.41             2.23                                            14.70   28.51    --     --     --     --
  Education                                                   1.70              0.25                                            1.43    2.65     --     --     --     --
  Living area (100 km^2^)                                     2.69              2.37                                            0.01    11.09    --     --     --     --

Number of hospital beds in a district, in 100.

Income in 1000 Euro per person.

Calculated as the total number of physicians/hospital beds in a district over 1000 inhabitants.

*PSP*, non-contract specialist; *PGP*, non-contract general practitioner; *CSP*, contract specialist; *CGP*, contract general practitioner.

###### 

Non-contract and contract physicians per specialty.

                              Mean    Std. dev.   Min.   Max.   Hosp.[a](#tblfn0020){ref-type="table-fn"}
  --------------------------- ------- ----------- ------ ------ -------------------------------------------
  *Non-contract physicians*                                     
  General practitioners       15.76   15.04       0      93     11.63
  Specialists                 37.24   47.46       0      274    51.37
    Ophthalmologists          1.42    2.68        0      17     56.73
    Dermatologists            1.47    2.51        0      16     43.50
    Gynecologists             4.71    5.04        0      29     57.02
    Otolaryngologist          1.13    1.88        0      14     63.19
    Pediatricians             1.75    2.44        0      13     45.50
    Lung doctors              0.46    1.03        0      7      60.00
    Neurologists              5.33    8.07        0      41     45.41
    Orthopedists              2.24    3.01        0      20     52.98
    Urologists                0.96    1.56        0      8      53.72
    Laboratory diagnostics    0.40    0.88        0      6      61.70
    Radiologists              0.93    1.52        0      11     49.55
    Surgeons                  8.07    12.27       0      81     67.64
    Internists                8.38    10.82       0      70     58.00
    Other specialists         2.50    3.70        0      31     54.84
  *Contract physicians*                                         
  General practitioners       34.98   20.58       1      161    7.89
  Specialists                 32.42   33.13       0      227    19.66
    Ophthalmologists          3.08    3.03        0      23     24.60
    Dermatologists            2.32    2.47        0      17     26.41
    Gynecologists             4.64    5.00        0      38     20.00
    Otolaryngologist          2.03    2.14        0      16     40.73
    Pediatricians             2.58    2.60        0      20     18.71
    Lung doctors              1.25    1.46        0      10     18.95
    Neurologists              4.04    4.21        0      32     37.30
    Orthopedists              2.31    2.53        0      13     33.81
    Urologists                3.53    3.63        0      21     36.47
    Laboratory diagnostics    0.39    0.75        0      5      72.92
    Radiologists              1.81    1.75        0      10     44.69
    Surgeons                  2.82    3.83        0      22     48.26
    Internists                5.64    6.27        0      46     29.84
    Other specialists         0.89    1.56        0      10     45.37

Share of physicians working in public and private hospitals.

###### 

Number of physicians per district (year 2008).

  Number of physicians            PSP   PGP   CSP   CGP
  ------------------------------- ----- ----- ----- -----
  Less than 5                     7     19    13    2
  More than 5 and less than 25    56    79    54    39
  More than 25 and less than 50   30    18    32    61
  More than 50                    28    5     22    19
  Sum                             121   121   121   121

*PSP*, non-contract specialist; *PGP*, non-contract general practitioner; *CSP*, contract specialist; *CGP*, contract general practitioner.

###### 

Estimation results.

                                                                         *PSP*                                            *PGP*
  ---------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------ -------------------------------------------------
  Density of *PSP*                                                       --                                               0.371[\*\*\*](#tblfn0035){ref-type="table-fn"}
                                                                                                                          (0.038)
  Density of *PGP*                                                       0.679[\*\*\*](#tblfn0035){ref-type="table-fn"}   --
                                                                         (0.118)                                          
  Density of *CSP*                                                       −0.036                                           −0.060
                                                                         (0.167)                                          (0.091)
  Density of *CGP*                                                       −0.376                                           −0.396[\*\*\*](#tblfn0035){ref-type="table-fn"}
                                                                         (0.254)                                          (0.127)
  Density of private hospital beds[a](#tblfn0025){ref-type="table-fn"}   −0.017                                           0.003
                                                                         (0.077)                                          (0.025)
  Density of public hospital beds[a](#tblfn0025){ref-type="table-fn"}    0.070[\*\*\*](#tblfn0035){ref-type="table-fn"}   −0.022[\*\*](#tblfn0030){ref-type="table-fn"}
                                                                         (0.026)                                          (0.010)
  Average income[a](#tblfn0025){ref-type="table-fn"}                     0.340                                            −0.181
                                                                         (0.327)                                          (0.191)
  Education[a](#tblfn0025){ref-type="table-fn"}                          1.656[\*\*](#tblfn0030){ref-type="table-fn"}     0.342
                                                                         (0.591)                                          (0.255)
  Living area[a](#tblfn0025){ref-type="table-fn"}                        0.010                                            −0.011
                                                                         (0.028)                                          (0.012)
  Observations                                                           847                                              847
  *R*^2^                                                                 0.880                                            0.787
  Overidentification: *χ*^2^(13)                                         13.953                                           10.727
  Endogenous regressor                                                   *PGP*                                            *PSP*

*PSP*, non-contract specialist; *PGP*, non-contract general practitioner; *CSP*, contract specialist; *CGP*, contract general practitioner. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (50 replications).

Variables are time-invariant.

\* Significance at 10 percent level.

Significance at 5 percent level.

Significance at 1 percent level.

###### 

Estimation results for specific specializations.

  Variable                                               Physician density                                                                                                                                  
  ------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------
  Density of *PGP*                                       0.164[\*\*\*](#tblfn0055){ref-type="table-fn"}   0.150[\*\*\*](#tblfn0055){ref-type="table-fn"}   0.134[\*\*\*](#tblfn0055){ref-type="table-fn"}   0.164[\*\*\*](#tblfn0055){ref-type="table-fn"}
                                                         (0.050)                                          (0.056)                                          (0.044)                                          (0.039)
  Density of *CSP*[a](#tblfn0040){ref-type="table-fn"}   −0.473                                           −0.300[\*](#tblfn0045){ref-type="table-fn"}      −0.555[\*\*](#tblfn0050){ref-type="table-fn"}    −0.469[\*\*](#tblfn0050){ref-type="table-fn"}
                                                         (0.468)                                          (0.183)                                          (0.199)                                          (0.166)
  Density of *CGP*                                       −0.322[\*](#tblfn0045){ref-type="table-fn"}      0.054                                            −0.056                                           −0.200[\*\*](#tblfn0050){ref-type="table-fn"}
                                                         (0.168)                                          (0.085)                                          (0.137)                                          (0.092)
  Density of private hospital beds                       0.010                                            0.096[\*](#tblfn0045){ref-type="table-fn"}       0.067[\*](#tblfn0045){ref-type="table-fn"}       −0.020
                                                         (0.043)                                          (0.050)                                          (0.038)                                          (0.050)
  Density of public hospital beds                        0.021[\*](#tblfn0045){ref-type="table-fn"}       −0.003                                           0.014                                            0.015
                                                         (0.012)                                          (0.014)                                          (0.014)                                          (0.016)
  Average income                                         0.132                                            0.354                                            0.314                                            −0.143
                                                         (0.198)                                          (0.244)                                          (0.202)                                          (0.265)
  Education                                              0.671[\*](#tblfn0045){ref-type="table-fn"}       0.280                                            0.104                                            1.290[\*\*\*](#tblfn0055){ref-type="table-fn"}
                                                         (0.362)                                          (0.302)                                          (0.286)                                          (0.290)
  Living area                                            −0.002                                           −0.030[\*\*](#tblfn0050){ref-type="table-fn"}    −0.017                                           0.002
                                                         (0.007)                                          (0.013)                                          (0.012)                                          (0.009)
  Observations                                           847                                              847                                              847                                              847
  *R*^2^                                                 0.706                                            0.755                                            0.572                                            0.716
  Overidentification: *χ*^2^(13)                         14.556                                           9.465                                            9.597                                            17.500

Contract physician with identical specialty as the corresponding dependent variable.

*PSP*^*S*^, non-contract surgeons; *PSP*^*N*^, non-contract neurologist; *PSP*^*G*^, non-contract gynecologists; *PSP*^*I*^, non-contract internists. Intercept not reported. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (50 replications).

Significance at 10 percent level.

Significance at 5 percent level.

Significance at 1 percent level.
